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        “Les Français d’abord” (Jean-Marie Le Pen).1
 
1. Introduction 
Extreme right parties have recently increased their average vote shares to about 15 per cent in 
Western Europe.  While they have managed to be part of the coalition governments in Austria, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland, they are also permanent and sizeable fixtures in 
Norwegian and French parliaments. Norris (2004, p.2) puts forward a puzzle about the rise of 
extreme right in Europe: “…[these parties] have arisen in established democracies, affluent post-
industrial ‘knowledge’ societies, and cradle-to-grave welfare with some of the best-educated and 
most secure populations in the world, all characteristics which should generate social tolerance 
and liberal attitudes antithetical to xenophobic appeals.”  This paper provides an explanation to 
this puzzle. 
 In the last two decades, the literature on the rise of extreme right in Europe has sought the 
explanation in (1) immigration (Anderson 1996, Knigge 1998, Mayer and Perrineau 1989, 
Golder 2003), (2) unemployment (Knigge 1998, Jackman and Volpert 1996) or its dependence 
on immigration (Lewis-Beck and Mitchell 1993, Golder 2003), (3) electoral characteristics 
(Jackman and Volpert 1996, Swank and Betz 1996), and (4) the magnitude of the districts and 
the allocation of parliamentary seats in upper tiers (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997).   
Kitschelt’s (1995) extensive and detailed analysis of 1990 World Values Survey, 
however, points to a more fundamental reason underlying the support for extreme right.  He 
finds that the blue-collar workers and small-business owners – who are over-represented in the 
extreme right parties’ constituencies – possess traditionalist values such as support for social 
1 “The French first.” 
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order and cultural homogeneity. The raison d’être of this paper is our conviction that these 
values, in conjunction with the socially-tolerant and “open” values of the society at large, 
catalyze the impact of socioeconomic factors (such as unemployment and immigration) on the 
support for extreme right. In other words, not only would the voting behavior of a society be 
fundamentally affected by its individuals’ values, but also the impact of such socioeconomic 
factors would be embedded in and filtered through the Weltanschauung of the voters. While one 
would expect that encompassing universal, open values as a world view would negatively affect 
the support for extreme right, its interaction with socioeconomic factors can be more involved 
and complicated. Would people maintain their values if their material welfare is threatened? 
Does openness provide an institutional framework whereby every movement and ideology can 
form and operate easily in the political sphere, or does it trigger more elaborate socioeconomic 
dynamics ex post?   
Our main contribution to the literature lies in first establishing the relationships among 
openness, immigration and unemployment, and that they are more complicated than previously 
thought, and then sorting them out with significant findings. In particular, we use Golder’s 
(2003) data set and basic setup to investigate the links between openness, immigration, 
unemployment and the support for extreme right in Europe.2 We establish that in more open 
societies, the stand-alone direct effect of openness on neofascist votes is, as expected, negative.3 
Paradoxically, however, in such societies, immigration and unemployment lead to a higher 
support for neofascist parties. We explain this with a socioeconomic conjecture that the 
2 The sample includes 19 countries spanning elections in the period 1970-2000: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 
3 Betz (1994), Canovan (1999), Swank and Betz (2003) and Golder (2003) use the same categorizations in 
distinguishing neofascist parties from populist parties, which we too follow. 
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vulnerable native segments in a more open society, which are more welcoming to immigrants, 
exhibit a higher tendency to turn to the neofascists as immigration and unemployment start 
threatening their material welfare. Moreover, we find no stand-alone effect of openness on 
populist votes. Openness only operates on populist support through the channel of 
unemployment, with the channel of immigration being insignificant. While this can be explained 
with the same conjecture above, it is important to show that the neofascist and populist support 
differs on another sphere.  
 To facilitate the analysis, we construct a societal openness index using the data base of 
the European Social Survey (ESS, 2004). This survey enables us to compute country scores on a 
number of basic individual values. These values are aggregated into two different dimensions of 
openness, where the first dimension represents the tension between Openness to Change vs. 
Conservation, and the second dimension captures that between Self Transcendence vs. Self 
Enhancement.4 As it is based on the contrast between universal vs. traditional values, this 
openness measure encompasses more than the usual meaning of “social tolerance and liberal 
attitudes antithetical to xenophobic appeals” (Norris, 2004, p. 2). We use a summary openness 
measure that brings together all these values and also experiment with disaggregated dimensions 
as a robustness check.  
Our results have very significant implications about socioeconomic dynamics that may 
arise in welfare states, in particular, about the conflict between welfare “chauvinism” vs. welfare 
generosity, as well as their relation to the distribution of power in the political arena. In 
4 Openness to Change comprises the values of self-direction and stimulation, while Conservation comprises 
tradition, conformity and security.  Self-Transcendence comprises the values of universalism and benevolence, 
while Self-Enhancement comprises the values of power and achievement.  See the Appendix for a detailed 
description of these basic values and as to how they are measured by the ESS, 2004. 
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particular, our results seem to stand in contrast to the findings of Swank and Betz (2003), who 
report that “welfare states characterized by universal coverage of populations, a generous social 
wage and well developed employment policies depress the support for the new far right in times 
of new risks and insecurities.”  
 At this point, it would be relevant to ask whether and how European countries differ in 
the scale of openness. The data suggest that there are significant inter-national variations in the 
openness levels in Europe. Figure 1 in Appendix shows that the countries are scattered rather 
asymmetrically along the openness spectrum.5 The top of the list, indicating the least open 
countries, is crowded by Southern European countries, while most Nordic countries exhibit a 
higher degree of openness. Most of the Western-Central European countries are in the middle 
ranks. Openness also comprises an important part of the country-specific factors that the 
literature has used.6 We essentially model part of these country-specific factors by bringing 
openness into the picture. 
 In Section 2, we provide a background for the construction of the openness index and the 
distinction between neofascist and populist parties. Section 3 provides our statistical model.  In 
Section 4, we discuss the results, linking them to a wider literature. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Construction of Openness 
ESS (2004) identifies nine motivationally distinct values with varying degrees of importance 
5 The scores of openness are scale-invariant, i.e., negative values do not mean that the country is not open. 
6 Roland (2004) terms such values as slow-moving institutions while terming legal and political institutional as fast-
moving institutions. 
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across societies. The battery of questions from which individuals’ values are extracted and the 
methodology of constructing this battery are based on Schwartz (1992). These nine values are 
universalism, benevolence, power, achievement, self-direction, stimulation, tradition, 
conformity, and security.7 They are aggregated into two distinct dimensions of openness, each 
having opposing value sets. In particular, one value set Openness to Change comprises the 
values of self-direction and stimulation, where its opposite value set Conservation comprises 
tradition, conformity and security. Thus, our first openness dimension is denoted as OPENDIM1 
and is the difference between the  Openness to Change score and Conservation score of the 
country. On the other hand, Self-Transcendence comprises the values of universalism and 
benevolence, and its opposite Self-Enhancement comprises the values of power and 
achievement.8 OPENDIM2 is the difference between Self-Transcendence and Self-
Enhancement. The construction of these two-dimensional openness measures follows the 
discussion and detailed suggestions of Barnea and Schwartz (1998) and ESS (2004). Figure 2 in 
Appendix portrays the categorization of these value sets. Figure 3 displays the spectrums on 
which European countries lie in terms of OPENDIM1 and OPENDIM2, while Figure 4 plots the 
two different openness dimensions against each other.9 The simple correlation between them is 
found to be 0.56 and statistically significant. While this is not too high, it is not too low either. 
This provides us with room to aggregate the two dimensions and come up with a single openness 
index. The overall index of OPENNESS is the summation of OPENDIM1 and OPENDIM2. It is 
7 The reason why we do not take a tenth value, hedonism, into consideration is that there is no theoretical 
background regarding its effect on party choice (see Barnea and Schwartz 1998).  
8 Openness to Change, Conservation, Self-Transcendence and Self-Enhancement scores are the averages of their 
corresponding individual values. 
9 ESS (2004) does not report any value scores for Malta, hence we will not be able to use that country in our 
analysis. 
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important to note that using a single index is a better option than using the two dimensions 
separately in a regression, because in the latter case, common information between the two 
dimensions is lost (in a regression, other modeled factors are held constant in interpreting an 
effect). Thus, our focus is on the single OPENNESS index, while we also experiment with 
OPENDIM1 and OPENDIM2 as a robustness check. We provide a more detailed information 
about values in Appendix. 
Values upon which we base our OPENNESS index have predicted more than 15 different 
behaviors in 20 countries (e.g., voting, delinquency, cooperation, competition, consumer 
purchasing, environmental, religious behaviors - Bardi and Schwartz 2003 and Schwartz and 
Bardi 2001). Schwartz (1994) argues that basic values are the foundations of individuals’ 
specific political values and ideologies, and may enable them to organize their political 
evaluations in a relatively consistent and coherent manner. Barnea and Schwartz (1998) contend 
that the key values that distinguished different segments of voters in the Israeli elections of 1988 
were tradition vs. self-direction. In a group of 14 countries, Barnea (2003) finds that in countries 
where political competition is more concerned with issues of national security vs. equal rights 
and freedoms for all, security and conformity vs. universalism and self-direction turn out to be 
the central basic values. In countries where the main concern of political competition is the 
economic redistribution, “universalism and benevolence” vs. “power and achievement” turn out 
to be the central basic values. 
 
2.2. Neofascist and Populist Parties as Components of Extreme Right 
 While it is easy to define a typical neofascist party, as very commonly agreed upon,   
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populism is a notoriously vague term, and that attempts at establishing a general theory about its 
nature have been problematic (see Canovan 1999). For instance, many populist parties were 
typically perceived as left-wing in Latin America, while the contemporary European parties are 
regarded as right-wing, an aspect that contributes to the ambiguity. Another aspect is that, it is 
not the ideology and the policy content that distinguishes populist parties from others, but their 
appeal to ‘the people’ against both the structure of established structure of power and the 
dominant elite ideas and values. As opposed to neofascist parties, populist movements are of the 
people rather than of the system; the fact that the term “movement” is used very frequently in the 
context of populist parties points to their attempt to maintain a movement character rather than 
being organized as an institutionalized party. Their programmatic flexibility is also remarkable. 
In welfarist, high-tax countries they may embrace an agenda of economic liberalism, elsewhere 
they may subscribe to a protectionist and statist agenda against the prevailing heavy dose of free 
market policies. 
 Populist movements contend that, unlike neofascist parties, they exhibit strong desire to 
win political influence.  One of their central aspects is the constant reference to grass roots and 
ordinary/little people to whom malevolent elites pose danger.  These parties reject any 
particularistic group claims, resist all forms of compulsory solidarity (such as trade unionism) 
and refer to the people as a unitary entity: as Canovan (1981, p. 265) points out “the notion that 
people are one, that divisions among them are not genuine conflicts of interest … are essential” 
in populist discourse. Populists, with their strong scepticism of representative democracy and 
elitist parliamentarism, express a deep desire to expand participatory and plebiscitary processes 
such as petition drives, citizen initiatives and referendums.  In a sense, they side with a crude 
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majoritarianism that neglects or overrides the rights of minorities. 
 Heinisch (2003, p. 95) provides further contrasts between populist and neofascist parties.  
Populist parties, he argues, typically do not subscribe to the openly anti-egalitarian and anti-
Western positions of neofascist parties, which are founded on the belief in the natural inequality 
of humans - be it “biological, genetic … to justify intellectual and cultural hegemony..”  Nor do 
the populist parties adhere to the authoritarian conception of the state or the law-and-order 
doctrine that is directed towards all kinds of external and internal threats such as immigrants, 
criminal elements, as well as their critics and political opponents. Further, unlike neofascist 
parties, populist parties are not typically hostile to political compromises, nor do they subscribe 
to an ideological mission as the neofascist parties strongly do. 
 The above points from Canovan (1981, 1999) and Heinisch (2003) underlie the essence 
of how populist parties are distinguished from neofascist parties, pointing to an ambiguity as to 
the definition and discourse of populist parties. We keep this in mind in our analysis. We do not 
combine neofascist and populist votes into a single measure of extreme right, because the 
distinction is very compelling. Table 0 in Appendix presents whether neofascist and/or populist 
parties ever existed in our sample countries.  
 
3. The Statistical Model 
We estimate the variants of the following two equations to investigate the relationships among 
openness, immigration and unemployment:  
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where VOTESHARE is the percentage national electoral support for either neofascist or populist 
parties, UNEMP denotes the percentage of the total labor force that is unemployed at the national 
level in an election year, IMMIG stands for the percentage of the national population composed 
of foreign citizens,  is the variable that measures the conditional effect of 
unemployment and immigration on the electoral success of extreme right parties, LOGMAG 
denotes the log magnitude of the median legislator’s district and UPPERTIER stands for the 
percentage of assembly seats allocated in upper tiers above the district level, COUNTRY 
DUMMIES captures country fixed effects, and OPENNESS is either single or two-dimensional 
openness index.
IMMIGUNEMP×
10
 Equation (1) has also been used by Golder (2003). While we replicate the results with 
that model for comparison purposes, our focus is on results with Equation (2). These 
constructions are based on three types of arguments (Golder 2003): 
1. The “ideational argument” hypothesizes that higher levels of immigration increase the 
support for extreme right. 
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10 As mentioned above, we use Golder’s (2003) data set. For all data sources, see 
http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/codebook.pdf. 
2. The “materialist argument” relates unemployment to the support for extreme right parties 
through the interaction effect with immigration (i.e., ). That is, 
unemployment increases the support for extreme right  parties when immigration is high. On 
the other hand, unemployment does not affect their vote shares when immigration is low. 
IMMIGUNEMP×
3. The “instrumental argument” links the motivation of elites and other voters for voting to 
the support for extreme right. If these groups are instrumentally motivated, then extreme 
right parties would enjoy a higher support in countries with large district magnitudes and a 
large number of upper tier seats. This, however, will not be observed if they are expressively 
motivated, i.e., in the neofascists’s case. 
 
 We use the censored tobit estimation technique to estimate the models above. The reason 
behind this choice is the potential sample selection bias that may arise due to exclusion of 
countries without extreme right parties from the analysis. For instance, Golder (2003) states that 
extreme right ideologies exist in nearly every country, and their electoral support cannot be 
observed if they do not organize into political parties. While there are other methods that take 
into account the potential selection bias, such as Heckman’s (1978) two-stage selection model, 
censored tobit provides us with a chance to compare our results with the previous literature. In 
addition, many political scientists resort to this technique as the estimation method under similar 
circumstances (see Jackman and Volpert 1996). Thus, for the analysis, the dependent variable is 
“constructed” in such a way that countries with extreme right parties have their actual vote 
shares, and those without them are assigned a zero value. This is a left-censored limited 
dependent variable, and the regression can be estimated with censored tobit.  
 Note that COUNTRY_DUMMIES entail effects that are unchanged or at least very stable 
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over time, such as a country’s geographic location and characteristics (e.g., its distance from the 
equator, whether it is landlocked or not etc.), whether a country was ever part of a world war, or 
those factors that are at least very stable over the course of the time period considered, such as 
income and asset inequality. We interpret openness as another ‘institution’ in this class of 
factors. Also note that, when OPENNESS, as a time-invarying variable, is incorporated into the 
first equation, country-specific dummies must be dropped from the regression. Whether or not 
dropping the country dummies to bring in OPENNESS creates an omitted variables problem is 
tested formally in our empirical framework. In particular, we use a simple specification test 
where the linear and quadratic fitted values of vote shares from the first stage regressions are 
included back in the model in a second stage, and the significance of these terms is tested 
afterwards. If these terms are found to be jointly significant, which is tested through Likelihood-
Ratio tests in the maximum likelihood context, this implies that the omitted variables problem is 
present in the model (i.e., Ramsey RESET test). A series of specification tests show that our 
modeling procedure is legitimate. In the case of populist vote shares, the model with country 
dummies successfully pass the test (the fitted terms are jointly insignificant). After removing the 
dummies, the problem is detected as expected. When we bring OPENNESS into the picture in 
the second equation (both as a single measure as well as in two different dimensions), the models 
pass the test again successfully. The test results in the neofascist case are largely consistent with 
above. In this case, our models with the single OPENNESS measure (our preferred models) pass 
the test successfully, while the model with two-dimensional measure marginally passes due to 
the information loss with the decomposition practice (see Section 2.1). 
 Another issue is whether country-specific effects can be treated as random, rather than 
fixed, in a panel framework and be retained in the model (recall that the first model assumes 
them to be fixed by using country-specific dummies). The use of random effects is possible, 
however, if they are not correlated with the error term. We check this in the first model through a 
Hausman (1978) test. Our tests reject the null of no correlation (presented at the bottom of Table 
2), and thus, we are not able to use random effects models with OPENNESS and its interactions. 
 
4. Results and Interpretation 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of key variables. The left panel of Table 2 presents the 
estimation results for the determinants of neofascist votes, while the right panel presents those 
for populist votes.  
 
4.1. Determinants of Neofascist Votes, and Openness  
Model 1 is also estimated by Golder (2003). In this model, unemployment has a negative and 
strongly significant effect, while LOGMAG’s effect is positive and significant. The interactive 
term  is insignificant. When country dummies are removed in Model 2 (which 
is done to prepare a basis for using OPENNESS), LOGMAG loses its significance and 
UPPERTIER becomes significant at 5%.
IMMIGUNEMP×
11 Interestingly, unemployment changes its sign from 
negative to positive, maintaining its significant effect, albeit at a mild level (10%). In addition, 
immigration becomes positive and significant at 1%, and IMMIGUNEMP×  is significant, with 
its sign being not as expected. This points to an important finding: country dummies are 
instrumental in revealing the effects of unemployment and LOGMAG on the neofascist support 
in Model 1.  
 Models 3 and 4 augment Model 2 with the single- and two-dimensional openness indices, 
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11 We check whether the exclusion of Malta in Model 2 due to data unavailability makes any difference to the 
results, and find that they remain essentially the same. 
respectively. The estimation results show that nearly all variables in these models are estimated 
to be strongly significant, possessing signs that point to interesting results. In particular, the 
significance levels of both the socioeconomic and instrumental variables are high, and the signs 
are as expected (note, for instance, the differing signs of unemployment between Model 1 and 
Model 3, which is primarily caused by the catalyzing effect of country-specific factors). In 
addition, just like in Model 1, we estimate the immigration-unemployment interactive term as 
insignificant as to its effect on neofascist votes. Moreover, the single OPENNESS index is 
estimated to have a strongly significant negative effect on the support given to neofascist parties 
(Model 3). When we employ openness in two distinct dimensions, i.e., Openness to Change vs 
Conservation (OPENDIM1) and Self Transcendence vs Self Enhancement (OPENDIM2), we 
find that the first dimension (OPENDIM1) has a strongly significant and negative effect on 
neofascist votes (Model 4). In other words, when a society adheres very strongly to values such 
as stimulation and self direction but weakly to the values of conformity, tradition and security, 
the support for neofascist parties decreases. On the other hand, the other dimension 
(OPENDIM2) falls short of being significant at conventional levels.  
 As noted before, we will confine ourselves to our Model 3. We will elaborate on the 
interpretation of OPENNESS by taking the derivative of the dependent variable with respect to 
this variable: 
 
UNEMPIMMIG
OPENNESS
NEOFASCIST ×+×+−=∂
∂ 244.0224.1687.4  
This derivative implies that the stand-alone effect of the OPENNESS index on neofascist votes is 
negative. In other words, when the levels of IMMIG and UNEMP are zero, the more open a 
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country is, the less support neofascist parties receive. Increasing any of the immigration or 
unemployment variables alleviates the impact of OPENNESS on nefascist votes. Further, when 
we consider the median values of IMMIG and UNEMP in our data set, which are 2.7 and 5.4, 
respectively, the median impact of OPENNESS on the neofascist votes is found to be close to 
zero. This strongly suggests that it is more informative to look at the distribution of the values of 
IMMIG and UNEMP, rather than a single statistic, in order to form a better-informed opinion on 
the direction of the effects (we come back to this below).  
 One could also pursue the following direction in interpreting the coefficient of the 
interaction term: 
 OPENNESS
IMMIG
NEOFASCIST ×+=∂
∂ 224.1358.0  , OPENNESS
UNEMP
NEOFASCIST ×+=∂
∂ 244.0244.0  
The derivative taken with respect to IMMIG implies that immigration has a stand-alone positive 
effect on neofascist votes. It turns out that openness has a magnifying effect on the impact of 
immigration on neofascist support. Likewise, the stand-alone positive effect of unemployment on 
neofascist votes seems to be magnified by OPENNESS. All these results point out two extremely 
significant findings: 
a. When the positive slope coefficient of IMMIG and UNEMP in the above derivative is 
considered, it is implied that there is a conflict between openness and economic 
concerns (i.e., socioeconomic dynamics). 
b. When the median value of OPENNESS, -0.44, is considered, the support for 
neofascist votes is negative, at least in an important part of the distribution of 
elections across Europe. 
We will delve into these findings in the next two sub-sections. 
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 4.1.1. Conflict between Openness and Socioeconomic Dynamics 
The positive slope coefficient estimated for the interactive term between OPENNESS and 
immigration as well as for unemployment suggests that in open societies (i.e., those which 
adhere strongly to basic values such as self-direction, stimulation, universalism and benevolence 
- Openness to Change and Self-Transcendence – and weakly to the values of tradition, security, 
conformity, achievement and power  - Conservation and Self-Enhancement), the support given 
to neofascists due to high immigration and unemployment is higher. In other words, rather than 
promoting tolerance to socioeconomic distress associated with the presence of immigrants, 
openness becomes associated with higher neofascist support.  This is a seemingly counter-
intuitive result, but indeed suggests a striking finding in terms of the relationship between 
openness and socioeconomic dynamics. How can this happen? 
 Let us consider again the derivative of neofascist vote share with respect to openness:  
  UNEMPIMMIG
OPENNESS
NEOFASCIST ×+×+−=∂
∂ 244.0224.1687.4 .  
 Let us now consider two countries, Country 1 and Country 2, where Country 2 has a 
higher OPENNESS index than Country 1. Assume also that these countries are identical in their 
unemployment and immigration levels (whatever those levels may be). Our finding suggests the 
following socioeconomic dynamics in voting behavior: higher openness sentiment in Country 2 
is expected to give rise to a more welcoming attitude to immigrants by a larger greater segment 
of society (relative to Country 1). This will, in turn, trigger a shift of voters that are in the 
vicinity of voting for neofascist parties to actually vote for them (for evidence on the possibility 
of such vote-switchings, see Norris, 2004, p. 6).  In other words, the higher is the level of 
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openness, the higher is the general support for immigrants in the society, thus, the higher is the 
consequent concern level by people in the vicinity of neofascists, and therefore, the greater is the 
shift of votes to neofascists. It is plausible to conjecture that the worry level of those who are in 
the vicinity of neofascists would be escalated due to their predictions that a greater majority of 
society would welcome immigrants with social support and welfare programs. In Country 1, this 
is less likely to happen because the society is less welcoming to immigrants due to the lower 
level of openness. It is relatively well-known that welfare generosity across Europe tends to 
stimulate support for anti-immigrant parties (see Jesuit and Mahler, 2004, for instance). Kitschelt 
(1995) also argues that extreme-right parties often embrace “welfare chauvinism” seeking to 
restrict the social welfare state to non-immigrant population only. 
 Our mechanism above can also be seen through the following derivatives:  
OPENNESS
UNEMP
NEOFASCIST ×+=∂
∂ 244.0244.0 , OPENNESS
IMMIG
NEOFASCIST ×+=∂
∂ 224.1358.0  
These imply that the impact of unemployment on neofascist support as well as that of 
immigration on this support is higher in more open societies. In other words, in a more open 
society, unemployment and immigration are associated with higher neofascist vote share, 
suggesting strongly that the vote shifting behavior would take place as a response to the society 
being more open.  
 This mechanism of shifting votes that our findings suggest, is expected to intensify when 
we consider a situation where voter turnout of the neofascist segment of the society is higher and 
that of more mainstream segments is lower, as it usually happens (Givens, 2002, p. 156, for 
instance, found that higher rates of non-voting take place in regions of Austria, France and 
Germany, where the support for the extreme right is higher). As pointed out in Section 2.2, 
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neofascist voters are more expressive and they are more likely to turn out for voting. On the 
other hand, when the majority of the society sticks to a certain political stance, members of that 
majority segment are less likely to turn out for voting due to their pre-conception that their stance 
will already win. 
 Overall, our results shed light on socioeconomic dynamics related to vote switching 
triggered by the level of openness. As will become clear below, our results on the determinants 
of populist votes also suggest extremely interesting avenues but somewhat different than the 
neofascist case. 
 
4.1.2. Distribution of Neofascist Support Across Europe 
Our results on the median effects of OPENNESS, unemployment and immigration have 
important implications on the distribution of neofascist votes across Europe. In order to track the 
implications of our results for each country’s elections, we evaluate of the derivative of 
neofascist vote shares with respect to OPENNESS at all data points of immigration and 
unemployment (see Table 3).12 The figures generated are very illustrative in that they facilitate 
observation of the support level of neofascist parties, i.e., whether they are being positive or 
negative,13 and whether and how the support changes over time within a country. Take, for 
instance, the case of the Netherlands. The trajectory of neofascist support in the Netherlands is 
such that it is first non-existent in the major part of the 1970s, but as unemployment increases 
rather sharply in 1980s and with moderately increasing values of immigration, the support turns 
out to be positive in the 1980s and 1990s. The sharp changes (i.e., increases) in neofascist 
12 For this exercise, only the countries where neofascist parties actually participate the elections are used. 
13 We do not interpret the magnitudes of these figures as they are from a tobit regression. 
support are also pronounced in Spain, Germany and France.14 Figure 6 plots the impact of 
OPENNESS on support levels of neofascist parties through 1970s to 1990s. It is revealed 
strikingly that OPENNESS prevents neofascist parties from getting positive support in some 
countries, as the level of support for them remains in the negative territory (i.e., Greece, 
Portugal, and in the majority of elections in Italy). In another group of countries, however, 
OPENNESS can either not prevent the negative effect becoming positive (e.g., Netherlands, UK, 
Spain) relative to the above set of countries, or the base of the trajectory is already set in the 
positive territory (e.g., France, Germany, Switzerland).15  
 
4.2. Determinants of Populist Votes, and Openness 
Model 5 in Table 2 finds that both immigration and unemployment have insignificant effects on 
populist votes, while the interactive term IMMIGUNEMP× is significant at 5%, having a 
positive sign. This is a support for the materialist argument that unemployment matters when 
only immigration is high. The catalyzing effect of country dummies is evident with their removal 
in Model 6, as seen through changing significance of unemployment, LOGMAG and 
UPPERTIER from Model 5 to Model 6. Moreover, immigration becomes significant with the 
unexpected negative sign.  
 In our Models 7 and 8, we augment the specification with single and two-dimensional 
OPENNESS, respectively. As before, our focus is on the single dimensional case, i.e., Model 7 
(Model 8 can be interpreted in the vein as above). First, we estimate the stand-alone effect of 
                                                          
14 It is not difficult to see that the changes in neofascist support are driven by the time-varying variables of 
unemployment and immigration, but the OPENNESS variable, having positive figures for some countries and 
negative for others, determines the base of the trajectory. 
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15 There are of course factors not modeled in our context and may have upward or downward (e.g., Switzerland) 
effects on the support levels of neofascist parties. 
OPENNESS on populist votes to be insignificant. The interactive term between OPENNESS and 
immigration is also estimated to be insignificant. However, OPENNESS interacts significantly 
with unemployment in raising the vote share of populist parties. In other words, the impact of 
OPENNESS on populist support works only through unemployment (note that it also worked 
through immigration in the neofascists’ case). Also, all other variables (except 
) are estimated to be insignificant. This implies that OPENNESS and its 
interaction terms capture most of any significant effect found in Model 6. In comparison to 
Model 5 (where all the instrumental variables are significant), this may indicate that vulnerable 
segments in the society with minimal job security are encouraged to vote sincerely by a less 
stringent electoral system.  
IMMIGUNEMP×
 Let us elaborate further on these results. The first striking fact is that, unlike the case of 
the neofascist support, there is no stand-alone effect of OPENNESS on populist support. In other 
words, openness as a stand-alone virtue is not effective on the vote shares of populists. Put 
differently, for openness to have any effect on populist support, it has to go through 
unemployment and the socioeconomic dynamics it triggers. To see how this effect works, take 
two countries, Country 1 and Country 2, where Country 2 is more open than Country 1. If 
unemployment is zero, there is identical support for populist parties in both countries. However, 
when we have a positive level of unemployment, the derivative  
UNEMP
OPENNESS
POPULIST ×=∂
∂ 527.1  
implies that the more open Country 2, would exhibit more support for populist parties. It can be 
easily observed that power is mostly held by mainstream (i.e., non-neofascist and non-populist) 
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parties across Europe.16 In fact, Golder (2003) suggests that (Figure 1, p. 444) a significant 
portion of votes in European elections have gone to more mainstream parties, implying that the 
mainstream parties would hold the power in determining the course of social support and welfare 
programs, as well as budgetary procedures. Thus, our results imply that many segments in the 
society including blue collars, those who are unemployed or have minimal job security would 
back up populist parties, who, in their programs and discourse, make generous promises or offer 
simplistic alleviation schemes regarding unemployment.17
 Supporting the conjecture above is OPENNESSIMMIG
UNEMP
POPULIST ×+×=∂
∂ 527.1185.0 . 
This implies that the impact of unemployment on populist votes is enhanced upwards by more 
openness, i.e., that in a more open society, unemployment is associated with a higher populist 
vote share (note also the impact of immigration on the responsiveness of populist votes to 
unemployment in this derivative; this is due to the significant interaction effect between 
unemployment and immigration). 
 Finally, let us evaluate the derivative for the distribution of populist support across 
Europe: 
  UNEMP
OPENNESS
POPULIST ×=∂
∂ 527.1 .  
 This implies that across all data points of unemployment, openness has a positive effect 
on populist support. Table 3 shows the distribution of populist support across all elections in 
Europe. Figure 7 plots these values. It is obvious that, starting with very modest values in early 
and mid-1970s, populist support has been increasing strongly in Europe across time even though 
                                                          
16 One might argue that populist parties may take part in forming coalitions. But this is a post-election fact. 
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17 Openness is expected to be consistent with welfare generosity. 
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it exhibits some fluctuations along the path. 
 
4.3. Openness, Immigration and Unemployment Interactions 
Our results suggest that openness, immigration and unemployment are effective on both the 
neofascist and populist vote shares, albeit through different channels. Both unemployment and 
immigration, through their interactive term, are associated with higher vote shares of populist 
parties. When we bring openness into the picture, we find that openness channels more votes to 
populist parties through higher unemployment. We explain this with the conjecture that “the 
blue-collar underclass with minimal job security,” “the petit bourgeoisie [i.e.,] small 
entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, merchants, self-employed artisans, and independent farmers” that 
are “among those [segments] most vulnerable to new social risks” generally feel “the threat of 
‘the other’: driven by patterns of immigration, asylum seekers and multiculturalism.”18 This is 
expected to result in a higher support for populist parties, which, with their generous promises of 
costless solutions to the problem of unemployment and social risks, are expected to act for their 
interests, as opposed to mainstream parties. The mainstream parties, with their majority power in 
the political arena, represent more open sentiments and embrace generous welfare schemes for 
everyone (including immigrants) and budgetary discipline.   
 Betz (1994) suggests that it is this residual underclass of low-skill people, who are most 
prone to social risks are more likely to blame ethnic minorities for their hardships, and are`more 
prone to blame governments for failing to bail them out.  The failure of social democrat elites to 
maintain or restore a sense of security and well-being for these vulnerable segments provides 
support for populist leaders who do not refrain from making such promises or offering simplistic 
18  The quoted parts are from Norris (2004, p. 3), which are also used frequently by Betz (1994).  
solutions.  Lubbers, Gijberts and Sheepers (2002) find support for this view and report that the 
unemployed, blue-collar workers, the retired, the less educated are overrepresented in the 
constituencies of the extreme right in Western Europe (some of these findings are verified by 
Norris, 2004, too). 
  In the case of neofascists, the dynamics is much more complex, involving interactions 
among openness, immigration and unemployment. First, immigration and unemployment have 
stand-alone effects on the neofascist vote share. In addition, in line with his findings, the 
interactive term is estimated to be insignificant. When we introduce openness, 
the first prominent finding turns out to be a significant and negative stand-alone effect of 
openness on neofascist votes. In other words, unlike the populist case, neofascist parties start in a 
“disadvantaged” position in a more open society, other things being equal. Secondly, they start 
“recuperating” from this disadvantageous position via immigration and unemployment. The 
vulnerable segments of the society, who are disturbed by the presence of immigrants (who may 
possibly be attracting welfare generosity of mainstream parties) and are therefore more prone to 
blame immigrants for deteriorating conditions, will seek refuge in neofascist parties to express 
their discontent and their support of cultural protectionism. 
IMMIGUNEMP×
 
4.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
 Regarding the specification test in the neofascist case (recall that in the populist case, all 
the models pass the tests successfully), when openness is used in two dimensions, the model 
passes the test if the interaction term is not used. With the interaction term, the test terms become 
jointly significant at 7%. This is possibly because when two different openness dimensions are 
used jointly in the model, their common effects drop out of the regression, resulting in 
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information loss.19 This lends credence to using openness as a uni-dimensional index. 
 Another robustness check is related to the argument that ignoring countries without 
extreme right parties in a regression may lead to a sample selection bias. As noted in Section 3.1, 
underlying this argument is the notion that extreme right tendencies exist nearly in every 
country, even though they may not form into political parties. While the argument is insightful, a 
useful robustness check for our purposes would be to estimate the models with OPENNESS and 
its interactions by using countries that actually do have neofascist and populist parties. It may be 
that our OPENNESS variable may control any sample selection bias by capturing the underlying 
grounds that give rise to extreme right tendencies. Table 4 presents the results with OLS 
estimations. We only discuss the models that include OPENNESS and its interactions. In the 
neofascist case (Model 3 in Table 4), OPENNESS and its interactions are estimated to be weakly 
significant (with significance levels around 18-20%), with the stand-alone effect being negative, 
and the interaction terms possessing positive signs, as found in Section 4.1. Considering that we 
employ only nine countries in this analysis (see Table 0) and that OPENNESS is a time-invariant 
variable, there may not be enough variation for this variable, and thus the level of significance is 
understandable. However, the exactly same signs found as above are noteworthy. In this model, 
we estimate IMMIG, UNEMP and LOGMAG with significant and positive signs and 
with a negative and significant sign. As per the populists’ case (Model 6), we 
obtain consistent signs as in Section 4.2. OPENNESS, capturing the stand-alone effect, is 
estimated to be insignificant, while its interaction term with unemployment is estimated to be 
IMMIGUNEMP×
  
 
23
                                                          
19 There are marginal cases in Models 1 and 2. While Model 2 cannot pass the test as expected, Model 1 marginally 
passes (or marginally fails) the test. Following our logic above, this is also possibly due to common country-specific 
effects in Europe such that with or without country dummies, information loss may appear in the regression. 
However, bear in mind that the significance of the fitted terms is marginal. 
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significant with a positive sign. Different than before, we estimate the interaction term with 
immigration to be significant, possessing a negative sign (this variable was insignificant in 
Section 4.2). The results regarding the interaction terms of OPENNESS imply that, in this 
restricted sample, the socioeconomic dynamics that work through unemployment still hold, but 
openness works as a tolerating factor for immigrants, as higher levels of openness are associated 
with less support for populist parties. 
 
5. Conclusion  
Kitschelt’s (1995) extensive and detailed analysis of 1990 World Values Survey points to values 
as a fundamental reason underlying the support for extreme right.  It is clear that, when their 
material welfare is threatened by the economic distress via immigration and unemployment, 
individuals may not maintain their socially tolerant values. As Norris (2004) states, the puzzle is 
that the societies that have very open features exhibit this trade-off between their interests and 
values more.  Our main contribution lies in the way we answer this puzzle.   
 To summarize our results, in more open societies, the stand-alone direct effect of 
openness on neofascist votes is, as expected, negative. Seemingly paradoxically, however, 
openness increases the neofascist support indirectly through immigration and unemployment. 
We explain this with a particular socioeconomic dynamics in which vulnerable native segments 
of a more open society turn to the neofascists as immigration and unemployment start 
threatening their material welfare. Moreover, we find that openness has no stand-alone direct 
effect on populist support, but has indirect positive effects through unemployment. 
 Kitschelt (1995) notes that voters’ fears about the social welfare state lead to higher 
support for extreme right parties.  Betz (1994) adds that in that sense the extreme right parties 
  
 
25
serve as an outlet for political frustrations among losers in affluent societies.  When there is a 
high level of universal welfare generosity in the presence of heavy and sustained foreign 
migration, nativist and ultra-nationalist ideologies gain momentum. This is due to the fact that 
these two ideologies (for one reason or another) favor welfare chauvinism, seeking to limit the 
benefits of the social welfare state to the native-born population.  According to this view, the 
welfare state is supposed to provide social protection to the ones who have been contributing to 
it, not to the immigrants who are free-riders, or those who are ‘biologically/genetically inferior’ 
to justify intellectual and cultural hegemony (Heinisch, 2003).  That is, when immigration is 
high, the social protection will be crowded-out by unemployed immigrants, leaving less per 
capita social protection for the vulnerable native population (i.e., unemployed, blue-collar 
workers, the retired, the less educated – Lubbers et al. 2002, and Norris 2004) who may lose 
their jobs as immigrants replace them at low-paying jobs. 
 Segments that have little to lose from immigration in terms of unemployment and social 
protection will have little to fear and will probably continue voting for the mainstream parties 
that are defenders of the universal welfare generosity (see also Jesuit and Mahler 2004).  But 
these segments that may have a lot to lose from immigration in some form will be tempted to 
vote for the extreme right parties who want to stop (and perhaps reverse) immigration, and 
channel social welfare transfers to the natives only. 
Our results on the openness of a society fit this scenario well. We show that, when 
openness is higher in a society, the welfare generosity is more likely to be embraced by the 
median voter and thus by mainstream parties.  Vulnerable native segments will turn to populists 
more when unemployment becomes a more significant threat (i.e., these segments will expect 
less welfare chauvinism from the mainstream parties in a more open society and will expect 
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more generous promises and simplistic solutions against unemployment and other hardships 
from populist parties). When a society is more open, one can expect smaller support for 
neofascists but as immigration and unemployment increase, it is not hard to imagine that the 
vulnerable native segments will turn to the neofascists as well.  As such, our results in a sense 
seem to stand in contrast to the findings of Swank and Betz (2003) who report that “welfare 
states characterized by universal coverage of populations, a generous social wage and well 
developed employment policies depress the support for the new far right in times of new risks 
and insecurities.”  
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Appendix 
The European Social Survey (ESS) uses the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) in order 
to gauge peoples’ basic values. In the PVQ, there are short verbal portraits of different people. 
To point implicitly to the importance of a single basic value, each portrait includes items that 
describe a person’s goals, aspirations, or wishes. For example: “Thinking up new ideas and being 
creative is important to her/him,” and “s/he likes to do things in her/his own original way” refer 
to a person for whom self-direction values are important. “It is important to her/him to be rich” 
and “s/he wants to have a lot of money” defines a person who cherishes power values. In so 
doing, the verbal portraits determine the person’s values without explicitly identifying values as 
the topic of investigation. Respondents, for each portrait, answer the following question: “How 
much like you is this person?” “Very much like me,” “like me,” “somewhat like me,” “a little 
like me,” “not like me,” and “not like me at all.” For each portrait, respondents choose their 
response by checking one of the six boxes labeled with the response alternatives. Respondents’ 
own values are, therefore, inferred from their self-reported similarity to people who are described 
in terms of particular values. A six-point numerical scale is used in order to quantify the 
similarity judgments. The PVQ is comprised of 21 items that are combined into ten indices, one 
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for each of the ten basic values. Three items measure universalism, whereas two items are used 
to gauge each of the remaining nine values. For an item to measure a basic value, aims, goals, 
wishes, or efforts of the person described express or promote the central goal of the basic value 
or lead to its attainment. Different items cover different conceptual components of each value.   
To measure each value, related items’ scores are averaged at individual level.  To 
compute the country level figures, each country’s individual value scores are averaged. As to the 
measurement of higher-order values, the Conservation score is subtracted from the Openness to 
Change score to get the OPENDIM1 dimension, and the Self-enhancement score is subtracted 
from the Self-transcendence score to get the OPENDIM2 dimension. Finally, the OPENNESS 
index is the summation of OPENDIM1 and OPENDIM2.  
 The ten basic values are: 
 1. Self-direction: Independent thought and action in terms of choosing, exploring and 
creating.  To an individual who strongly possesses this value, it is very important to make his/her 
own decisions about what he/she does.  Such a person likes to do things in his/her own way.   
 2. Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.  Such an individual looks 
forward to do things in his/her own original way and is open to the consequent surprises.  As 
such, he/she would like to have an exciting life. 
 3. Tradition: To have respect for and acceptance of (as well as commitment for) the 
customs and ideas that the traditional culture (and/or religion) of the society provide for the 
individuals.  Such an individual tries not to draw attention to him(her)self and avoids doing 
things in his/her own ways.  Instead, he/she would like to follow the customs of his/her society 
that are handed down to him/her. 
 4. Conformity: To refrain from actions and inclinations that may violate social 
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expectations and norms.  Such an individual believes that people should do what they are told 
and follow rules at all times - even when they are not watched. 
 5. Security: To care about safety and stability in the society (as well as harmony in 
relationships).  It is important that the government ensures its citizens against all types of threats. 
 6. Universalism: It is defined as one’s understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and 
protection for the welfare of all people (as well as for nature).  Such an individual thinks that 
every person in the world should be treated equally and believes that everyone should have equal 
opportunities in life.  It also is important to her/him to listen to people who are different from 
her/him. Even when this person disagrees with them, he/she still wants to understand them. 
 7. Benevolence: To preserve and enhance the welfare of those who are one’s family, 
friends, and acquaintances.  Such an individual would like to help people around him/her; such a 
person would like to care about them.  One likes to be loyal to his/her friends and, if possible, 
likes to devote him(her)self to the people close to him/her. 
 8. Power: To care about social status and prestige - as well as control and dominance 
over people (and resources).  Such a person cares about having a lot of wealth and expensive 
things that are visible to others.  It is very important to such a person to get respect from others 
and such an individual wants others to do what he/she says. 
 9. Achievement: It is defined as having personal success by demonstrating competence 
according to commonly agreed-upon standards.  Such a person needs to show off his/her abilities 
and wants others to admire what he/she does.  Being successful is very important to such an 
individual; he/she hopes that the others will recognize his/her achievements. 
-2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5
OPENNESS
Iceland
France
Finland
Switzerland
Denmark
Sweden
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Norway
Germany
Belgium
United Kingdom
Austria
Italy
Ireland
Spain
Portugal
Greece
Figure 1. Openness Across Europe
 
 
Figure 2. Structural Relations Among Ten Values (Barnea and Schwartz 1998) 
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Table 0. Have Extreme Right Parties  
Ever Existed in Western Europe? 
 Neofascist Populist 
Austria No Yes 
 Belgium No Yes 
Denmark No Yes 
Finland No No 
France Yes Yes 
Germany Yes Yes 
Greece Yes No 
Iceland No No 
Ireland No No 
Italy Yes Yes 
Luxembourg No No 
Netherlands Yes No 
Norway No Yes 
Portugal Yes No 
Spain Yes No 
Sweden No Yes 
Switzerland Yes Yes 
UK Yes No 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Key Data 
Variable Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. 
      
Neofascist+ (%) 1.53 0.60 8.7 0.03 2.03 
Populist+ (%) 7.68 6.45 26.9 0.2 6.30 
Immigration (%) 5.10 2.7 36.6 0.2 6.32 
Unemployment (%) 6.09 5.4 22.7 0 4.40 
Openness -0.45 -0.44 0.37 -1.93 0.60 
 
 + Actual votes. 
 
Table 2. Neofascist and Populist Parties and OPENNESS  
  (1)±  (2) (3) (4)  (5) ±  (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent Var: Neofascist Vote Share Dependent Var: Populist Vote Share 
Immigration 0.245 0.170 0.358 0.421 0.870 -0.727 -0.533 -0.657 
 (0.952) (2.614)*** (4.89)*** (5.29)*** (1.140) (-2.174)** (1.60) (1.49) 
Unemployment -0.197 0.146 0.244 0.408 -0.859 -0.870 0.220 0.128 
 (-2.642)*** (1.724)* (2.01)** (2.65)*** (-1.363) (-1.938)* (0.38) (0.22) 
Log Magnitude 1.540 0.215 0.396 0.462 3.694 0.788 0.424 -1.437 
 (4.352)*** (0.930) (2.04)** (2.55)** (2.363)** (0.715) (0.38) (1.35) 
Uppertier -0.082 0.046 0.079 0.069 1.973 0.158 0.136 0.017 
 (-1.459) (2.187)** (3.80)*** (3.40)*** (4.221)*** (1.714)* (1.41) (0.20) 
Immigration*Unemployment 0.005 -0.041 -0.016 -0.025 0.218 0.315 0.185 0.249 
 (0.292) (-2.351)** (0.87) (1.45) (2.328)** (3.836)*** (2.10)** (2.37)** 
OPENNESS   -4.687    -2.568  
   (5.03)***    (0.55)  
OPENDIM1    -20.118    -5.096 
    (5.47)***    (0.51) 
OPENDIM2    6.079    -1.956 
    (2.78)***    (0.29) 
Immigration* OPENNESS   1.224    -0.480  
   (5.75)***    (0.56)  
Unemployment* OPENNESS   0.244    1.527  
   (1.95)*    (2.20)**  
Immigration* OPENDIM1    1.862    5.492 
    (6.31)***    (2.36)** 
Immigration* OPENDIM2    0.485    -3.067 
    (1.54)    (2.99)*** 
Unemployment* OPENDIM1    1.573    0.478 
    (3.63)***    (0.36) 
Unemployment* OPENDIM2    -0.645    2.107 
    (2.40)**    (2.15)** 
Constant -7.11 -2.979 -5.428 -6.291 -41.93 -7.235 -7.386 -1.865 
 (3.39)*** (-2.888)*** (4.73)*** (5.13)*** (0.407) (-1.531) (1.48) (0.41) 
Country Dummies Yes No No No Yes No No No 
RAMSEY test  (LR-test) 5.40 (0.07) 4.77 (0.09) 3.70 (0.16) 5.25 (0.07) 1.57 (0.21) 3.36 (0.04) 0.90 (0.41) 1.07 (0.34) 
Hausman (Fixed vs Random Eff.) 9.16 (0.10) - - - 28.72 (0.0) - - - 
Observations 150 150 143 143 150 150 143 143 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. For Ramsey test, likelihood-ratio test statistics and p-values in parentheses (the null 
hypothesis assumes no omitted variables bias). For Hausman test, chi-squared test statistics and p-values in parentheses (the null hypothesis assumes no correlation between random effects and 
error terms). ± Also reported by Golder (2003). 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3. Actual and Predicted Distribution of Neofascist and Populist Support  
  Actual  Values NeoFas Popul.   Actual Values NeoFas Popul. 
Country Year OPEN IMMIG UNEMP   Country Year OPEN IMMIG UNEMP   
Austria 1970 -0.68 2.30 1.40 -- 2.14 Italy 1972 -0.72 -- 6.00 -3.22 9.16 
Austria 1971 -0.68 2.40 1.30 -- 1.99 Italy 1976 -0.72 -- 6.20 -3.17 9.47 
Austria 1975 -0.68 3.00 1.80 -- 2.75 Italy 1979 -0.72 0.50 7.20 -2.32 10.99 
Austria 1979 -0.68 3.50 2.10 -- 3.21 Italy 1983 -0.72 0.70 7.50 -2.00 11.45 
Austria 1983 -0.68 3.60 4.10 -- 6.26 Italy 1987 -0.72 1.00 9.80 -1.07 14.96 
Austria 1986 -0.68 3.60 3.10 -- 4.73 Italy 1992 -0.72 1.60 8.80 -0.58 13.44 
Austria 1990 -0.68 5.30 3.20 -- 4.89 Italy 1994 -0.72 1.60 11.10 -0.02 16.95 
Austria 1994 -0.68 8.80 3.80 -- 5.80 Italy 1996 -0.72 2.00 11.70 0.62 17.87 
Austria 1995 -0.68 8.90 3.90 -- 5.96 Neth. 1971 -0.15 2.20 1.30 -1.68 -- 
Austria 1999 -0.68 9.20 3.80 -- 5.80 Neth. 1972 -0.15 2.20 2.30 -1.43 -- 
Belgium 1971 -0.46 7.40 1.70 -- 2.60 Neth. 1977 -0.15 2.90 5.60 0.23 -- 
Belgium 1974 -0.46 7.80 2.30 -- 3.51 Neth. 1981 -0.15 3.70 8.90 2.01 -- 
Belgium 1977 -0.46 8.30 6.30 -- 9.62 Neth. 1982 -0.15 3.80 11.90 2.87 -- 
Belgium 1978 -0.46 8.40 6.80 -- 10.38 Neth. 1986 -0.15 3.80 8.30 1.99 -- 
Belgium 1981 -0.46 8.90 9.50 -- 14.51 Neth. 1989 -0.15 4.20 6.90 2.14 -- 
Belgium 1985 -0.46 8.90 10.40 -- 15.88 Neth. 1994 -0.15 5.10 7.10 3.29 -- 
Belgium 1987 -0.46 8.80 10.00 -- 15.27 Neth. 1998 -0.15 4.30 4.00 1.55 -- 
Belgium 1991 -0.46 9.10 6.60 -- 10.08 Norway 1973 -0.38 -- 1.70 -- 2.60 
Belgium 1995 -0.46 9.10 9.90 -- 15.12 Norway 1977 -0.38 1.80 1.60 -- 2.44 
Belgium 1999 -0.46 8.70 9.10 -- 13.90 Norway 1981 -0.38 2.10 2.30 -- 3.51 
Denmark 1971 0.02 -- 0.90 -- 1.37 Norway 1985 -0.38 2.40 2.90 -- 4.43 
Denmark 1973 0.02 1.80 0.70 -- 1.07 Norway 1989 -0.38 3.30 5.50 -- 8.40 
Denmark 1975 0.02 1.90 3.90 -- 5.96 Norway 1993 -0.38 3.80 6.60 -- 10.08 
Denmark 1977 0.02 1.80 5.90 -- 9.01 Norway 1997 -0.38 3.60 4.10 -- 6.26 
Denmark 1979 0.02 1.90 4.80 -- 7.33 Portugal 1975 -1.56 0.40 4.40 -3.12 -- 
Denmark 1981 0.02 2.00 8.30 -- 12.67 Portugal 1976 -1.56 0.30 6.20 -2.81 -- 
Denmark 1984 0.02 2.00 8.50 -- 12.98 Portugal 1979 -1.56 0.50 7.90 -2.15 -- 
Denmark 1987 0.02 2.50 5.40 -- 8.25 Portugal 1980 -1.56 0.60 7.60 -2.10 -- 
Denmark 1988 0.02 2.70 6.10 -- 9.31 Portugal 1983 -1.56 0.80 8.20 -1.71 -- 
Denmark 1990 0.02 2.90 7.70 -- 11.76 Portugal 1985 -1.56 0.80 9.20 -1.46 -- 
Denmark 1994 0.02 3.60 8.20 -- 12.52 Portugal 1987 -1.56 0.90 7.30 -1.80 -- 
Denmark 1998 0.02 4.70 5.20 -- 7.94 Portugal 1991 -1.56 1.20 4.20 -2.19 -- 
Finland 1970 0.09 0.20 2.30 -- 3.51 Portugal 1995 -1.56 1.70 7.30 -0.83 -- 
Finland 1972 0.09 0.20 3.00 -- 4.58 Portugal 1999 -1.56 -- 4.50 -3.59 -- 
Finland 1975 0.09 0.20 2.70 -- 4.12 Spain 1977 -0.78 0.50 5.30 -2.78 -- 
Finland 1979 0.09 0.20 5.90 -- 9.01 Spain 1979 -0.78 0.50 8.80 -1.93 -- 
Finland 1983 0.09 0.30 5.40 -- 8.25 Spain 1982 -0.78 0.50 16.30 -0.10 -- 
Finland 1987 0.09 0.40 4.80 -- 7.33 Spain 1986 -0.78 0.80 21.20 1.47 -- 
Finland 1991 0.09 0.70 6.60 -- 10.08 Spain 1989 -0.78 1.00 17.20 0.73 -- 
Finland 1995 0.09 1.30 15.40 -- 23.52 Spain 1993 -0.78 1.10 22.70 2.20 -- 
Finland 1999 0.09 1.70 10.20 -- 15.58 Spain 1996 -0.78 1.40 22.20 2.44 -- 
France 1973 0.24 6.20 2.70 3.56 4.12 Spain 2000 -0.78 2.00 14.20 1.23 -- 
France 1978 0.24 6.60 5.10 4.64 7.79 Sweden 1970 0.00 5.10 1.50 -- 2.29 
France 1981 0.24 6.80 7.30 5.42 11.15 Sweden 1973 0.00 5.00 2.50 -- 3.82 
France 1986 0.24 6.60 10.30 5.90 15.73 Sweden 1976 0.00 5.10 1.60 -- 2.44 
France 1988 0.24 6.40 9.90 5.56 15.12 Sweden 1979 0.00 5.10 2.10 -- 3.21 
France 1993 0.24 6.30 11.70 5.88 17.87 Sweden 1982 0.00 5.10 3.30 -- 5.04 
France 1997 0.24 6.30 12.30 6.03 18.78 Sweden 1985 0.00 4.60 2.90 -- 4.43 
Table continued on the next page… 
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  Actual  Values NeoFas Popul.   Actual Values NeoFas Popul. 
Country Year OPEN IMMIG UNEMP   Country Year OPEN IMMIG UNEMP   
Germany 1972 -0.43 5.70 0.80 2.49 1.22 Sweden 1988 0.00 5.00 1.80 -- 2.75 
Germany 1976 -0.43 6.40 3.30 3.95 5.04 Sweden 1991 0.00 5.70 3.10 -- 4.73 
Germany 1980 -0.43 7.20 2.70 4.78 4.12 Sweden 1994 0.00 6.10 9.40 -- 14.35 
Germany 1983 -0.43 7.40 6.90 6.05 10.54 Sweden 1998 0.00 6.00 8.30 -- 12.67 
Germany 1987 -0.43 7.60 6.30 6.15 9.62 Switz. 1971 0.04 17.40 0.00 16.61 0.00 
Germany 1990 -0.43 8.20 4.80 6.52 7.33 Switz. 1975 0.04 18.50 0.30 18.03 0.46 
Germany 1994 -0.43 8.60 8.40 7.89 12.83 Switz. 1979 0.04 15.60 0.30 14.48 0.46 
Germany 1998 -0.43 9.80 9.40 9.60 14.35 Switz. 1983 0.04 15.70 0.90 14.75 1.37 
Greece 1974 -1.93 1.30 2.10 -2.58 -- Switz. 1987 0.04 15.80 0.70 14.82 1.07 
Greece 1977 -1.93 1.60 1.70 -2.31 -- Switz. 1991 0.04 17.40 2.00 17.10 3.05 
Greece 1981 -1.93 1.90 4.00 -1.39 -- Switz. 1995 0.04 19.30 3.50 19.79 5.34 
Greece 1985 -1.93 1.80 7.00 -0.78 -- Switz. 1999 0.04 19.40 3.10 19.82 4.73 
Greece 1989 -1.93 1.70 6.70 -0.97 -- UK 1970 -0.47  2.20 -4.15 -- 
Greece 1989 -1.93 1.70 6.70 -0.97 -- UK 1974 -0.47  2.00 -4.20 -- 
Greece 1990 -1.93 1.60 6.40 -1.17 -- UK 1974 -0.47  2.00 -4.20 -- 
Greece 1993 -1.93 1.60 8.60 -0.63 -- UK 1979 -0.47  4.60 -3.56 -- 
Greece 1996 -1.93 1.60 9.60 -0.39 -- UK 1983 -0.47 2.80 11.10 1.45 -- 
Greece 2000 -1.93  11.20 -1.95 -- UK 1987 -0.47 3.20 10.60 1.82 -- 
       UK 1992 -0.47 3.50 10.00 2.04 -- 
       UK 1997 -0.47 3.60 7.00 1.43 -- 
 
 
 
Table 4. Using Actual Vote Shares - Neofascist and Populist Parties (OLS Estimations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent Var: Neofascist Vote Share Dependent Var: Populist Vote Share 
Immigration -0.020 0.086 0.212 -0.201 -0.287 0.523 
 (0.09) (1.01) (2.42)** (0.17) (1.04) (1.11) 
Unemployment -0.250 -0.005 0.337 -0.728 -0.304 1.580 
 (1.36) (0.03) (1.72)* (1.08) (0.60) (1.77)* 
Log Magnitude 0.116 0.390 0.392 2.327 1.473 -0.131 
 (0.70) (2.64)** (2.32)** (2.11)** (1.22) (0.13) 
Uppertier -0.063 0.015 0.051 1.544 0.028 -0.069 
 (0.99) (1.20) (1.43) (4.24)*** (0.41) (1.02) 
Immigration*Unemp. 0.025 -0.023 -0.049 0.117 0.031 -0.247 
 (1.22) (1.52) (2.16)** (1.12) (0.54) (2.36)** 
OPENNESS   -2.246   -2.825 
   (1.32)   (0.31) 
Immigration* OPENNESS   0.501   -2.972 
   (1.30)   (3.18)*** 
Unemp.* OPENNESS   0.301   2.177 
   (1.36)   (2.24)** 
Constant 4.062 0.571 -1.677 -1.830 7.118 3.562 
 (0.96) (0.42) (1.27) (0.10) (1.51) (0.59) 
Country Dummies Yes No No Yes No No 
Observations 50 50 50 49 49 49 
R-squared 0.76 0.19 0.30 0.64 0.09 0.41 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
